he actual form that internationalization would take and the interests which it stands to promote, however, are part of a different and more complicated story. In Colombia, the terrain of international law is dominated by legal experts not so clearly in favor of a negotiated solution. Colombian publicists routinely invoke international law to frustrate negotiations and compromise. Their version of law, held to be singularly authoritative, is actually quite unreflective of contemporary international practice; dismissive of legal alternatives; and un-conducive to resolving the conflict. As such, an "internationalization" that advances primarily the use of international law authority by local actors as the vehicle for peace talks will likely fail. The dominant conception of law, in this setting, is generally directed against lending legal legitimacy to political compromise. FIU Faculty Publications
The government granted de jure amnesty to 3,252 FARC fighters for political offenses. Justice Minister Enrique Gil Botero explained that this decision only benefits those subversives who are in the transitional zones ones created in as part of the final agreement. "It's an administrative amnesty which applies only to members of FARC concentrated in the transitional zones and not those interned in prisons," said the Minister. He added that the UN has been monitoring compliance with the final agreement by the Government. El Espectador
Colombia's road to peace is riddled with potholes, and today the country hit a big one. On May 17, Colombia's Constitutional Court, accepting a legal challenge introduced by Ivan Duque of the right wing Democratic Center party, amended two aspects of the law allowing Congress to approve the legislation underpinning the government's peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). After voters struck down the original FARC peace deal in a national referendum in October 2016, the government decided to approve the laws to implement the agreement through Congress using fast track powers granted by the Constitutional Court. These powers cut down the time needed to approve the laws in Congress, something the government, which only has about a year left to finalize the deal before it has to hand over power to a successor government, desperately wanted. Now that they have been altered, implementing meaningful peace could become much more difficult.Stratfor Worldview
This is crucial because in their current form, the new provisions in the transitional justice law are a slap in the conflict’s victims’ faces. They violate both the spirit and the intent of the peace accord—especially a part of the accord that took 19 long months to negotiate. If for some reason the Constitutional Court fails to bring Colombia’s transitional justice system in line with international standards and the spirit of the accords, WOLA will urge the International Criminal Court to act. WOLA
Almost 100 FARC political prisoners began an indefinite hunger strike on Saturday to demand better prison conditions and an acceleration and commitment to the peace process. The FARC inmates insisted that the state speed up its execution of the peace process, especially “that the release of political prisoners and the amnesty law become a reality.” Telesur English
The 2016 report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia warns of the restrictions, gaps and ambiguities of the Amnesty Law and of the JEP regarding public officials. It calls for recognition of state crimes. Colombia Plural
The debate on the so-called "responsibility of command" (RdM) in the constitutional reform that incorporates the "special peace jurisdiction" (JEP) into Colombian jurisprudence has been very difficult for at least three reasons: (i) Because if we do not solve it properly we run the risk of affecting the legitimacy and legal security of the peace agreement; (Ii) it is legally complex and can make it boring and difficult for many to understand; and (iii) has been unduly polarized because retired officers, especially ACORE (Associate of Retired Colombian Officers), have wrongly stated that those who argue that the regulation of RdM in JEP must respect international law is part of a conspiracy of leftists, who receive money so that the high military commands are judged more severely than the guerrillas; even that they are judged "in the most violent manner."
JEP adequately applying this RdM (Responsibility of command), both to the guerrilla fighters and to agents of the state is fundamental not only to avoid the impunity of those who have incurred this responsibility, but also to give a solid legal foundation to the peace process due to the obligations that Colombia has in terms of international law and that would allow eventual interventions by the ICC, should Colombia not comply with them. Rodrigo Uprimny, La Silla Vacía